The impact of regulation, ownership and business culture on managing corporate risk within the water industry by Allan, Richard et al.
The impact of regulation, ownership and business culture on 
managing corporate risk within the water industry 
 
Richard Allan
a
, Paul Jeffrey
a
, Martin Clarke
b
 and Simon Pollard
a* 
 
a
Cranfield University, Cranfield Water Science Institute, School of 
Applied Sciences and 
b
School of Management, Cranfield, 
Bedfordshire, MK43 0AL, UK 
*(Corresponding author); Email: s.pollard@cranfield.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT 
Although the specifics of water utility ownership, regulation and management culture have 
been explored in terms of their impact on economic and customer value, there has been little 
meaningful engagement with their influence on the risk environment and risk management. 
Using a literature review as the primary source of information, this paper maps the existing 
knowledge base onto two critical questions: what are the particular features of regulation, 
ownership and management culture which influence the risk dynamic, and what are the 
implications of these relationships in the context of ambitions for resilient organizations? In 
addressing these queries, the paper considers the mindful choices and adjustments a utility 
must make to its risk management strategy to manage strategic tensions between efficiency, 
risk and resilience. The conclusions note a gap in understanding of the drivers required for a 
paradigm shift within the water sector from a re-active to a pro-active risk management 
culture. A proposed model of the tensions between reactive risk management and pro-active, 
adaptive risk management provides a compelling case for measured risk management 
approaches which are informed by an appreciation of regulation, ownership and business 
culture. Such approaches will support water authorities in meeting corporate aspirations to 
become “high reliability” services while retaining the capacity to out-perform financial and 
service level targets. 
 
Keywords: culture, governance, legitimacy, ownership, regulation, risk. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Organizations responsible for the planning and delivery of utility services such as energy, 
transport and water are exposed to a wide array of ownership arrangements and regulatory 
frameworks, and exhibit diverse organizational cultures. The impact of these influences on 
the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery in the water sector has been a topic of 
concern for both researchers and practitioners over at least two decades (Richardson et al., 
1992; McGuinness & Thomas, 1997; Bakker, 2003a). However, studies seeking to better 
understand how ownership, regulation and business culture influence the operation of utilities 
have primarily focused on the economic and customer value oriented performance of the 
organizations under review. This is understandable given the broader public debate on the 
wisdom and benefits of privatized water services. However, somewhat surprisingly and of 
direct relevance to this contribution, few have considered the impact of regulation, ownership 
and business culture on water utilities’ approaches to managing commercial, operational and 
systemic risk. This is surprising given that risk plays a hugely influential role in decision 
making (Haines, 2011) and in the strategic, tactical and operational management of water 
utilities especially (MacGillivray et al., 2006; Pollard et al., 2007; 2009). Given that utility 
performance (against whatever metrics) is a function of how decision takers deliver results 
within the confines of what is deemed acceptable, it is unusual that more attention has not 
been paid to exploring the associated ‘risk dynamic’ (taken to mean the interplay between (i) 
the risks associated with utility actions and (ii) the management strategies and interventions 
for coping with these risks). 
The literature base presented in Table 1 constitutes a representative sample of papers that 
address the topics above and will be drawn upon later in the paper to illustrate significant 
features of our thesis. A preoccupation with efficiency and performance agendas is clear from 
the noted study findings, with remarkably little attention paid to other possible impacts of 
regulatory and ownership change. This is in stark contrast to other literatures, for example 
those concerned with the evolution of polycentric governance arrangements (Ostrom, 2010) 
and the influence of regulation on risk perception and management (Haines, 2011), which 
have recognized and articulated a rich landscape of influences on risk environments and 
management response preferences. Our own contributions in this area have been on 
benchmarking risk management capability within the international water utility sector 
(MacGillivray et al., 2006; 2007a, b; 2008) and exploring the operational antecedents of good 
risk governance in the sector (Hrudey et al., 2006; Pollard et al., 2007; 2009; Summerill et 
al., 2010a, b). Whilst, to date, we have focused on the provision of safe drinking water and 
good risk governance, the interface with regulatory and investment models has yet to be 
explored in depth. Here, then, we discuss these factors afresh in the new light of 
organizational structures and the financing of utility investments. 
An understanding of the nature and impact of risk within the water sector can only be attained 
with reference to the societal role which water services play. Although it is not the intention 
of this contribution to itemise or delineate all relevant risks, an overview of the central 
concerns that drive risk appreciation and management within the sector is warranted as a 
preamble to our analysis. The principal operational driver for any water and wastewater 
service provider is the delivery of fresh clean drinking water and the removal of wastewater 
in a safe and responsible manner. The Bonn Charter (2004) is the central statement of 
ambition here and constitutes a sectoral commitment, setting the framework for the basic 
operational and institutional arrangements necessary for the provision of water and waste 
water services, from source to tap. State and contractual performance measures provide 
operationally relevant targets but the Bonn Charter offers a (globally legitimate) consensus 
position on the principles of water service delivery. The primary objective of the Charter is to 
enable provision of “good safe drinking water that has the trust of consumers”. To achieve 
this, the service provider must aspire to provide water that is safe to drink, aesthetically 
pleasing, and in sufficient volume at a cost that is considered good value for money. The 
Charter links this ambition to a consideration of risk, stating that ‘management control 
systems should be implemented to assess risks at all points throughout water supply systems 
and to manage such risks’ (Bonn Charter, 2004: 9). A risk based approach to quality service 
delivery is evident in the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Drinking Water Quality 
Guidelines (2002) which documents the requirements for the provision of safe drinking water 
based on a preventative risk management philosophy. The WHO guidelines recommend the 
development and implementation of water safety plans (WSPs) and a detailed methodology 
for their development (WHO, 2002). 
The WSP approach is designed to assess the risks to water supply by: identifying mitigating 
actions that prevent raw water pollution from occurring; establishing appropriate treatment 
processes; and documenting risks to the water supply in distribution that prevent secondary 
contamination, post treatment. These risks might relate to asset condition, financing, 
technology performance, skills and competencies, or any of a whole host of factors embedded 
within and without the utility’s corporate remit. The principles within the WSP approach are 
scalable from small rural supplies to larger networks that serve urban centres. The WSP 
approach provides an important mechanism that enables water companies to take steps 
towards pro-active adaptive management, as discussed by Davison & Deere (2005). Other 
contributions (e.g. Byleved et al., 2008) build on this principle and explore the benefits of 
using safety plans to inform communication strategies when dealing with public health 
matters. Yet others, (Hrudey, 2001; Pollard et al., 2004; Hrudey et al., 2006) provide 
compelling evidence for the value of the risk management approach which lies at the heart of 
water safety plans, whilst Summerill et al. (2010b) have considered aspects of leadership in 
risk governance within the water utility sector. 
Building on our recent work (MacGillivray et al., 2006; 2008) and our proposal that vigilant 
and mindful organizations (Pollard et al., 2007; 2009) can successfully manage the challenge 
of cost reduction and risk mitigation, this review considers how ownership models, business 
culture and regulatory frameworks influence the ability of an organization to manage 
business risk. As these interrelationships are explored, the paper will consider other important 
influencing factors such as competition, management culture, leadership and governance that 
have a role to play in establishing an organization’s business strategy in delivering water and 
waste water services that meet regulatory objectives (quality, environmental and financial). 
Using a number of literatures as the primary source of information, the existing knowledge 
base is mapped onto two critical questions: (i) what are the particular features of regulation, 
ownership and management culture that influence the risk dynamic; and (ii) what are the 
implications of these relationships in the context of ambitions for resilient organizations? In 
addressing these queries, the paper considers the mindful choices and adjustments a utility 
must make to its risk management strategy to ensure that the tensions between efficiency, risk 
and resilience are effectively managed. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW METHODOLOGY 
The literature review was conducted over a period of approximately six months, utilising the 
library resources at the authors’ host institution. The primary research was conducted using a 
number of electronic library databases, as listed in Table 2. Output from the database 
searches was refined from thousands of publications down to 191 studies that focused on the 
principle topics related to our research themes. The papers selected for more detailed review 
were assessed based on the degree of certainty of the claims made within the studies and the 
extent to which the studies were generalised. We adopted a filtering and selection strategy 
based on the strength of knowledge claims made for the reported studies and their 
vulnerability to rejection, as specified by Wallace & Wray (2011). Additional refinement and 
enhancement of the literature base was achieved by identifying emerging themes and links, 
and by tracing the contributions of leading researchers in the various fields of study (see 
Table 2) to construct an understand of how their thinking has evolved and informed related 
research agendas. 
 
REGULATION AND RISK 
Although regulatory models for water utilities vary from country to country, they generally 
focus on the areas of operational performance, environmental protection, drinking water 
quality and cost effectiveness. As Parker (1998; 1999) notes, it has been necessary to 
implement financial regulation to prevent monopoly abuse as countries move towards 
privatized services. Parker highlights the important role of governance and its dependency on 
a country’s regulatory framework. A regulatory model fit for one country does not 
necessarily fit another country’s institutional arrangements. The UK, for example, works to 
five year regulatory (financial) contracts that set the objectives for each organization, and 
detail planned levels of infrastructure investment and predicted improvements in customer 
service delivery. The contracts document an agreed level of customer charges over the 
regulatory period. Each company’s performance is measured against the base plans submitted 
to the regulatory authorities. 
The specifics of regulatory frameworks are informed by a range of performance attributes 
such as economic benefit, water quality improvement and environmental protection intended 
to protect the interests of the consumer. Such arrangements shape how water and wastewater 
services are delivered within any given governance and ownership model. To illustrate the 
impact of regulation on the institutional risk environment, four dimensions of the relationship 
are considered: funding of the asset base; productivity of the organization; retail competition; 
and legitimacy of regulation. 
In order to meet the demands of regulation, a range of funding models has evolved to 
facilitate access to the capital required for investment. For example, in England, the funding 
arrangements are based on a fully privatized model with access to capital gained through a 
combination of shareholders, access to capital markets and customer charges. Interestingly, 
an alternative model was adopted by Welsh Water between 1989 and 2001, built around 
mutualization (examined by Thomas, 2000; 2001). Establishing the ownership and financial 
structure for Welsh Water had to take account of regulatory constraints and political views, as 
well as constitutional issues. The Welsh Water model raised issues around efficiency 
improvements, risk mitigation and distribution, and there was a principal challenge on the 
impact of functional separation of the utility business on customers. As Bakker (2003a; 
2003b) discusses, the UK water industry is constantly seeking alternative ways of securing 
sufficient capital to ensure regulatory objectives are met. For example, Bakker (2003b) points 
out that in June 2000, the Kelda water group, which owns Yorkshire Water, unveiled plans 
(which did not come to fruition) to mutualise its water service subsidiary. The objective was 
to create a non-profit community mutual with consumers owning the assets, but with 
operations remaining with the private organization. This would lead to asset-owning 
customers having a direct input into the running of a local business by making the customers 
the shareholders. An alternative model can be observed in Scottish Water, which remains a 
publically-owned utility financed through customer charges and an element of government 
borrowing. 
Abbott & Cohen (2009) highlight the influence of regulatory priorities on the productivity of 
water utilities (for example, the volume of drinking water produced and wastewater treated) 
and overall efficiency within the sector. They suggest that post-1995, changes to the price cap 
in the UK helped improve productivity over and above what might have been expected with 
privatization per se. Similarly, Rodriguez (2004) and Francois et al. (2008) discuss the 
financial challenges that utilities face in acquiring sufficient funding to ensure water quality, 
customer service and environmental objectives are met. Both studies highlight a tension 
between the general economic interest, public service provision, internal markets, 
competition and state intervention. 
These contributions on financing and productivity illustrate the constraints that a limited, 
periodic regulatory cycle impose on utility efforts to deliver regulatory obligations. Evidence 
suggests (MacGillivray et al., 2007a; 2007b) that when faced with an aging infrastructure and 
limited funds, utilities will prioritize short term interventions before long term mitigation 
measures (Hrudey et al., 2006). Such strategies instill a reactive approach to risk 
management, as resources (human as well as financial and technological) become focused on 
immediate priorities. In contrast, a mindful approach to risk management (Pollard et al., 
2008) under such circumstances would be characterised by contingency planning and, with 
little incentive for operators to value more pro-active strategies, even contingency planning 
will reflect restricted temporal and risk threat horizons. 
The third dimension of regulation worthy of consideration in the context of corporate risk 
management is the role that competition plays. Privatization theory (Boycko & Shleifer, 
1996) suggests public services can be improved through the introduction of competition. 
Cubbin & Stern (2004) discuss the role of competition within the utility sectors and observe 
that in some areas (gas, electricity and telecoms), the positive effects of competition took 
some time to show and evolved along with regulation. However, for utilities like water, 
where there is a public service obligation and significant networked infrastructure to deliver 
services, it is more difficult to establish true competition given the natural monopoly that 
exists. Stern (2010) examined lessons from the introduction of competition within energy 
markets and applied the knowledge base to the English and Welsh water sector. Stern points 
out that the recent Cave review (Cave, 2009) raised the issue of competition. He points to the 
liberalization of the telecoms and energy markets as relevant, and postulates that wholesale 
distribution of water could be opened up to competition in England and Wales, drawing on 
existing models in other utility sectors. This would require appropriate codes of practice, 
abstraction controls and consideration of the wider environmental costs to society. By 
contrast, Scotland has already opened up competition in water services. Sawkins & Reid 
(2007) looked at concerns that cross-subsidy existed in water services in Scotland and 
examined the approach taken to cross subsidization by the Scottish Executive; they point to 
the Water Services (Scotland) Act 2005 and the formation of the Water Industry Commission 
(WIC) that has been tasked with developing an approach to competition in the Scottish water 
market. The Scottish Executive published a number of statements and reports (Scottish 
Executive, 2004a; 2004b; 2005a; 2005b) as part of the consultation, concluding that the 
introduction of retail competition was desirable. Sawkins & Reid (2007) established a 
mechanism for the flow of cross-subsidy but also highlighted that more work was required to 
implement their framework. Competition in the retail markets in Scotland is now established 
with a number of licensed providers operating. 
There is little unambiguous evidence to support conclusions about the effectiveness of 
competition in public utility services. Water is essential for life and difficult to value. At 
present, it is typically only the costs of transporting and treating water that the customer pays 
for. Opening up water service provision to competition might create incentives to improve 
performance and efficiency but may also lead to additional operational risks (MacGillivray et 
al., 2006). For example, manpower reductions without the introduction of suitable alternative 
monitoring systems or controls could increase operational risks. Risk management strategies 
will need to be adjusted to compensate for any variations in service provision or new entrants 
to the market. Contracts between delivery partners will need to expose systemic risks and be 
clear on the owners of such risk (Ruester & Zschille, 2010). 
The dynamics exposed by the above discussion are illustrated in Figure 1. Regulation sets the 
ambitions and minimum performance standards that utilities must aspire to, with respect to 
efficiency, service, quality and environmental sustainability. Regulation also shapes the 
strategic operating environment for a utility and influences the relationship between utility, 
customers, markets and (increasingly) the natural environment. It also circumscribes a risk 
agenda in terms of both the character of dominant risks and a utility’s ability to respond to 
those risks (Macgillivray et al., 2006). As alluded to by Parker (1998), the priorities which an 
organization places on competing regulatory objectives within a regulatory contract period 
will have a direct impact on the company risk profile. 
 
OWNERSHIP AND RISK 
Water utilities must also demonstrate value for money. Ownership and efficiency have been 
widely debated internationally (Wallsten & Kosec, 2008; Martínez-Espiñeira et al., 2009; 
Bayliss, 2003; García-Rubio et al., 2010; McKay, 2003), and improvements to productivity 
and efficiency were a central consideration in policy decisions made by the UK government 
that led to privatization of the water companies in 1989. Emerging evidence suggests that 
successful privatization and efficient delivery of service is contingent on a wide range of 
additional factors (Ruester & Zschille, 2010; Saal et al., 2007). For example, a management 
culture that drives for efficiency within the limitations of a regulatory pricing review period 
and constrained funding availability tends to be characterised by a reactive management 
approach.  
The ownership arrangements of utility services vary widely at an international level (Table 3) 
but can be categorised into state ownership (or public ownership), private ownership, or a 
form of corporatised public–private partnership. Each variant has important consequences for 
the particular forms of risk experienced by a water service provider (Pollard et al., 2007) and 
the risk management tools available to them (Macgillivray et al., 2006). Responsibility and 
accountability for managing risk is the most obvious implication of utility ownership, with 
either society or shareholders sharing the burden. However, both public and private 
ownership models allocate risk and responsibility across a variety of individuals, institutions, 
corporate bodies, communities and even generations. Consideration of the ownership models 
in Table 3 invites discussion about how risk is distributed across the social, commercial and 
governance landscape. Indeed it could be argued that this would greatly aid an understanding 
of the challenges and advance the development of more integrated approaches to risk 
management. 
Interdependencies between regulation and ownership influence corporate risk management. 
Parker (1999), discussing the regulation of privatized public utilities in the UK, highlights the 
move from state-owned utilities to private ownership with governance through state 
regulation. He reported that the privatization model developed in the UK in the 1980s is now 
being used or adapted for use in other countries, introducing the private ownership of what 
were traditionally state-run organizations. He argues that privatization in the UK has 
provided benefits for consumers and investors with respect to reduced charges, quality 
improvements and return on investment. He explains that successful privatization is reliant on 
the legitimacy of regulation, effective relationships between the regulator and regulated body, 
and an appropriate institutional context. Highlighting examples in Asia, Latin America and 
Africa, Parker (1999) cites evidence of political instability that impact on the legitimacy of 
regulation, and therefore on the perceived independence of the institutions and individuals. 
Risk management practises within a specific jurisdiction will be influenced by local legal and 
institutional arrangements and have a direct impact on the reliability of service to consumers. 
For example, with a publically-owned utility such as those in Norway, Scotland or the 
Netherlands, the majority of the infrastructure and financial risk sits with the governing 
authority (see Table 3). As the ownership arrangements move towards the private sector, so 
the risk is shifted to a greater or lesser degree away from the governing institution. Table 3 
also highlights a contract management approach adopted in Germany and France, where the 
service providers and contractors hold the balance of operational risk. However, a weakness 
of this arrangement is that financial benefits to the controlling institution do not always 
deliver attractive or even sufficient returns on investment (Ruester & Zschille, 2010).  
The dynamic between regulation, ownership and risk management is re-enforced by Ruester 
& Zschille (2010) in their examination of the German water sector. Germany provides a 
useful case study because water services are provided by 765 individual suppliers, operated 
by the state through a range of business models that include municipal, private and public–
private partnerships on a regional basis. For public–private partnerships, there is a further 
subset of ownership models that Ruester & Zschille define as public sector ownership with 
support from private contracts for various elements of business operation. The diverging 
objectives of public and private operators can generate very different approaches to managing 
risk. Although for the private operator, profit is a significant concern, public authorities may 
prefer to outsource more difficult operations where environmental factors, age of assets or 
poor raw water quality (and therefore higher treatment costs) are considerations; this passes 
on higher cost to the operator and keeps the authorities direct overheads relatively low. Price 
caps on customer charges and constraints on access to capital for infrastructure investment 
leads to tension between new design and build infrastructure projects and capital maintenance 
requirements. This tension within the capital programme needs to be factored into mindful 
risk management choices.  
Other studies (Bhattacharyya et al., 1995; Shaoul, 1997; Bosworth & Stoneman, 1998; 
Renzetti & Dupont, 2003; Chenoweth, 2004; Dore et al., 2004; García-Sánchez, 2006; Bel & 
Warner, 2008) conclude that although private companies should be more efficient, evidence 
suggests this may not necessarily be the case. Renzetti & Dupont (2004) discuss factors that 
influence the performance of water utilities, highlighting that ownership is of particular 
interest. They point out that econometric modelling predicts that private ownership 
incentivises a reduction in costs to help achieve maximum benefit for shareholders and 
customers in the form of reduced charges. However, there is little empirical evidence to 
confirm this. Renzetti & Dupont argue that changes in ownership need to be accompanied by 
the introduction of competition if the move to privatization is to demonstrate greater benefit 
to the customer and shareholder. Parker (1999) supports this by highlighting that, where 
natural monopolies exist (such as water and waste water service provision), service providers 
(public or private) will only be motivated to improve performance when either legitimate 
regulation and/or competition is in place to create the necessary incentives. Renzetti & 
Dupont (2010) provide evidence that concurs with Ruester & Zschille (2010) that the 
specifics of size of operation, cost of treatment, geography, customer base and water 
resources (quality and quantity) all have an impact on the ability of a water service provider 
to achieve its performance targets. An additional factor influencing performance is variability 
in pricing policy and accounting practices that do not take into account the full cost of service 
provision. This is in agreement with Saal, Parker and others (Saal & Parker, 2000, Saal & 
Parker, 2001, Saal & Reid, 2004, Saal et al., 2007) who observe that when privatization of 
the water sector was introduced in the UK in 1989, the price cap regulations were relatively 
unchallenging and resulted in a lower than expected rate of efficiency improvement. It was 
not until 1995, when the price cap rules were reviewed, that efficiency improvements 
increased. However, the efficiency gains within the water industry in the UK were not as 
significant as those secured from earlier privatizations (e.g. gas, telecoms, electricity) due to 
the water companies’ regional monopoly position (lack of competition) and the relatively low 
initial price cap. Saal and Parker concluded that improvements in efficiency post 1995 were 
due to the changes in regulation rather than privatization per se. 
The literature reviewed in this section provides a compelling argument that public and private 
companies can deliver comparable economic performance, dependant on the right 
combination of business model choice, legitimate regulation and presence or absence of 
competition. The selection of studies we have reviewed provide evidence for a mutual 
influence between regulation and ownership (García-Rubio et al., 2010, Martínez-Espiñeira 
et al., 2009, McKay, 2003). Our review suggests that the price cap rules will limit or enable 
funding and that access to funding drives infrastructure investment choices. The balance 
between infrastructure replacement and capital maintenance will shape operational risks that 
ultimately influence the reliability of services to the customer. Figure 2 summarizes our 
discussions in this area. Efficiency improvements (both of themselves and their rate) are not 
dependent upon ownership models and are likely to be influenced more by regulatory 
interventions, leadership and cultural factors. Within our proposed framework, ownership 
does have an important influence on risk. As margins are squeezed in a privatized sector, 
perhaps as a direct result of more insistent regulation, decisions about prioritizing investment 
and driving efficiency in operational practices will necessarily expose some parts of the 
business to more risk than would hitherto have been the case. Pollard et al (2004) remind us 
that this tension can only be managed by vigilant and mindful organizations. 
 
BUSINESS CULTURE AND RISK 
 
The dominant business culture and leadership style found within a water utility will shape 
how the organization chooses to meet or exceed the targets and objectives set by regulation 
and other stakeholders. The influence of organizational culture on business performance and 
risk has been of growing interest to researchers and commentators since the 1980s, with 
Johnson (1992) developing a framework, known as “the culture web”, that is widely used to 
demonstrate the links between culture, strategy and management behaviour (Summerill et al., 
2010a, 2010b). Drew & Kendrick (2005) define culture as one of their five pillars of 
corporate governance (along with leadership, alignment, structure and systems) that are 
needed for integrated risk management. Baumgartner (2009) and Rizak & Hrudey (2007) 
demonstrate that embedding sustainability and risk management into the culture of an 
organization can lead to corporate success, though both are challenging concepts to drive 
home within a business. This is consistent with our view that culture and leadership style 
influence the risk management strategy of the water utility. 
As Stacey (1996) explains, organizations tend to desire known outcomes, but in order to be 
innovative they may need to occupy territory that has less certainty and agreement, and high 
degrees of epistemic and stochastic uncertainty. This view is supported by Osborn & Hunt 
(2007), Tetenbaum (1998) and Tetenbaum & Laurence (2011) who suggest that in today’s 
operating environment, organizations work within complex adaptive systems that force them 
into domains of high uncertainty. By contrast, organizations that are exposed to more 
regulation and governance tend to exhibit a more risk averse cultural base that desires greater 
certainty around the data used for decision making. We recognize the tensions inherent in 
operating as part of a complex system by suggesting that appropriate risk management 
cultures will provide a bridging function between uncertainty and risk. Within this context, 
water companies need to become more risk mature (MacGillivray et al., 2006; MacGillivray 
& Pollard, 2008) and look to preventative measures. This suggests that water utilities need to 
adopt a risk management culture that takes into account data, uncertainty (stochastic and 
epistemic), emerging risk, available finance, in addition to the competency of staff and 
regulatory objectives. We can classify this as a measured risk management culture. 
Useful indicators of such cultures can be found in other sectors. For example, Laeven & 
Levine (2009) consider the links between governance, regulation and risk-taking within the 
context of the 2008 changes to the banking system when some private banks were supported 
by public funding. Their contribution highlights that risk taking, and the incentives linked to 
risky activities, are related to both the ownership and culture of the business. They suggest 
that institutions that are controlled by fewer, more powerful, owners will take on more risk 
compared to banks that have a greater number of owners with lower stakes and cash flow. 
They conclude that regulation can have either a positive or negative effect on corporate risk, 
dependent upon the nature of ownership and the working culture of the organization. In a 
different context (that of executive board monitoring), Brick & Chidambaran (2008) also 
consider the interplay between regulation and risk-taking. They demonstrate that increased 
regulation has driven an increase in board monitoring as evidenced by data gathered between 
1996 and 2003. They conclude that externally imposed regulations can have an impact 
beyond the intended specifics of the directives themselves. They provide examples of 
regulations that make it more costly for institutions to operate with lower levels of board 
monitoring, due to the higher probability of lawsuits being successful as a result of poor 
performance. This is both a relevant and powerful example of regulations influencing 
behaviour, business culture and decision making.  
The influence of business culture on risk management strategy and performance has only 
partially been explored within the water industry. Summerill et al. (2010b) considered water 
safety plans as a move towards a more preventative risk management approach and found 
that organization culture plays a substantive role in the choices made by utilities with respect 
to how water safety planning was implemented. The study identified enabling and blocking 
cultural features that impacted the development of consistent water safety plans. The utilities 
in this study were self-motivated to produce the plans. However, time, resource and 
communication issues occasionally blocked progress. In contrast, enabling features included 
strong leadership, continuous improvement, community (and therefore customer) focus, 
proactive engagement, competition, empowerment and competency of the workforce. 
A critical component of business culture is leadership, which often has an impact on the risks 
that the organization is prepared to take (risk appetite), the culture within the business, the 
approach to achieving its objectives and the performance characteristics of the institution. 
Leadership is arguably the single most important influence on the success of any business. 
McKenna & Martin-Smith (2005) explore the importance of good leadership in making 
decisions with information and data sets which exhibit low confidence grades. Although 
human nature tends to favour operating in areas close to certainty where decisions are easier 
to justify, the majority of business leaders must make strategic decisions based on little 
evidence or data, which then forces decision making towards a more heuristic domain with a 
greater degree of epistemic uncertainty. Leaders that take more risks and make decisions 
based on intuition are perceived by their peers as stronger, entrepreneurial and more creative 
(see also Williams & Miller, 2002; Millet, 2006; Randall, 2006; and Singh, 2009). Within the 
context of the operation of a water company, choices must be made about investment and 
protection of public health which meet the demands of regulators, consumers and other 
stakeholders. Mindful and measured choices must be made that balance risk with operational 
performance.  
We have established that many decisions that need to be made within an organization sit 
within a domain that has low certainty and low potential for consensus, so that leadership and 
organizational culture influence the choices made. Now consider how decision making 
balances risk, efficiency and regulatory compliance in an uncertain operating environment. 
Gigerenzer and fellow researchers (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003; Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 
2005; Brandstätter et al., 2006; Katsikopoulos & Gigerenzer, 2008; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 
2009) offer us insight into the way individuals apply heuristic processes in making decisions 
with limited data. These works explain how simple heuristic systems have developed that 
allow fast decision making based on acceptance or rejection of a range of cues within an 
individual’s or group’s epistemic limits. This might explain why certain organizations with 
differing regulatory obligations and ownership structures prioritize objectives and targets in a 
way that legitimises their business strategy. This is of significant importance within this 
review as we identify the linkages between regulation and risk strategy. 
Figure 3 articulates the impact of organizational culture (and leadership) on a water utility’s 
approach to risk management. This in turn will have an influence over the resilience and 
financial stability of the organization. Hrudey et al. (2006), Pollard et al. (2004) and 
Summerill et al. (2010a) all emphasize the importance of culture on the adoption of specific 
risk management strategies and examine why organizations persist with a reactive approach 
to water quality failures and water safety planning.  
 
DISCUSSION: MANAGING RISK AND PROMOTING RESILIENCE 
Resilience can be defined as the ability to recover quickly from failure, and robustness as the 
ability to withstand a significant event (Pollard et al., 2004). In order to protect public health 
and maintain services to its customers, a water provider must ensure the networks it operates 
are resilient to challenge and the processes it operates are robust to, inter alia, changes in 
population, climate change and water scarcity (Blackmore & Plant, 2008; Wang & 
Blackmore, 2009). Where risk management enables an organization to focus on the ability to 
prevent failures and maintain a stable system, strategies to enhance resilience seek to develop 
interventions that support the ability of systems to adapt to change. Hence, risk management 
regimes that promote resilience will be pro-active rather than reactive, intentionally seeking 
out and characterizing risk within organizational plans and operations as a precursor to 
building resilience-enhancing capacities: a mindful risk management approach (Pollard et al., 
2009). In the context of core utility performance ambitions (such as those enshrined in the 
Bonn Charter), resilience theory, risk management and reliability engineering need to be 
considered in concert if performance is not be buffeted and compromised by the vagaries of 
regulation, ownership and management culture.  
Other research supports the need for further work to better understand the challenges a utility 
faces in making the shift from reactive to pro-active risk management. Hrudey et al. (2006), 
Pollard et al. (2004), Wu et al. (2009) and Rogers & Louis (2008) provide supporting 
evidence that regulation, ownership and culture have an influence on how a water utility 
approaches risk management (systemic or corporate). Mindful organizations that have 
developed high reliability systems will manage the tension between systematic risk and cost 
reduction. Paté–Cornell (1996, 2002a, 2002b, 2004) developed a critical framework for 
assessing uncertainty of risk at six levels which has become the basis for many stochastic and 
epistemic uncertainty models and systems; we acknowledge the significance of this 
contribution and the important role it plays in the development of a systematic approach to 
risk evaluation but we do not intend to fully discuss the work as it is now well embedded into 
systems risk management theory. 
We can also find evidence of the relationships between governance and risk, which has 
relevance to the research agenda developed here. Rothstein et al. (2006) draw our attention to 
the emergence of risk (systemic or corporate) as an organizing concept for regulation and 
governance which has led to many debates, particularly with respect to Ulrich Beck’s risk 
society thesis (1992). Rothstein et al. argue that more recent preoccupations with risk are not 
driven by changing distributions of real, or imagined, ills in society but rather by changing 
ills in governance. In fact, the paper emphasises that failure has always been a part of 
governance but more recent pressures on organizations (such as greater coherence, 
transparency and accountability) have exposed the limits of governance as a result of this 
greater awareness of institutional risk. Rothstein et al. conclude by arguing that risk 
“colonization” resulting from the dynamics of contemporary governance leads to risk 
defining the object, method and rationale of governance. We argue that management 
strategies need to remain agile and under review to take account of new and emerging risks 
resulting from changes to regulation, ownership and culture within a water utility business. 
Inflexible governance and risk management systems may result in creating further unintended 
corporate risk. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
 
The foregoing critique builds upon previous reviews by Walter et al (2009) and Bel & 
Warner (2008), and expands on these works by considering regulation, ownership and 
management culture as influences on the risk environment. Our review is summarized in 
Figure 4 as a conceptual framework of these interdependencies. The model illustrates how 
interventions by regulators or businesses, which are intended to achieve improvements for 
customers, may have unintended consequences. So, for example, limiting customer charges is 
beneficial to the customer and should drive innovation and value into an organization. 
However, it may also compromise long term quality improvements, sustainability and 
increase the risk of failing assets. Our review has identified that parameters such a capital 
constraints, uncertainty (stochastic and epistemic) and operational tensions will influence the 
business culture to behaviours that promote reactive risk management. Behaviours that 
promote reactive risk management are also influenced by the ownership structure and 
regulation. By contrast, maturity in risk management will promote a planned approach and 
strategic plan to deploy capital in a way which adds resilience to the utility, and is likely to 
shift the organisation in the direction of pro-active and adaptive risk management. Again, 
regulation, ownership and the business culture will influence the utilities approach to risk 
management. As a conceptual model of the dynamic between risk and a significant slice of a 
utility’s operating environment, Figure 4 is both descriptive and diagnostic, proposing 
explanations for shifts in risk management approach. The extent to which it also supports 
critical analysis and prognosis can only be confirmed by subsequent deployment through case 
study research. It does, however, provide a validated (if admittedly rather mechanistic) model 
for understanding the interaction of regulation, ownership and business culture on risk 
management choices. 
In the foregoing sections we have illustrated some examples of regulatory mechanisms (price 
caps, quality standards, introduction of competition) that influence this framework. We have 
documented a range of ownership models which will be informed by regulation (public 
ownership, privatization and a range of models in between) and inform the business culture, 
which influences the balance between reactive and adaptive proactive risk management. We 
classify this balance of choice as “measured” risk management. Although our review 
demonstrates that uncertainty (stochastic and epistemic) incentivises reactive risk 
management, it also suggests that operating within the time bound limits of a regulatory 
contract and the availability of capital funding has more of an influence over the balance 
between reactive risk management (typically under restricted funding conditions) and 
proactive risk management (where there is adequate access to capital markets).  
Water utilities operate within a dynamic business environment and are subject to changes in 
regulation, objectives and ownership models that will affect the risk profile of the 
organization. It is clear from our review that utilities must remain vigilant to change and 
constantly re-evaluate the appropriateness of risk management strategies in order to manage 
risk (systemic and corporate) and cost reduction challenges. There is a clear need to better 
understand how to best craft an organization’s risk management strategy under different 
operating conditions, supporting a measured risk management culture. An improved risk 
management model will support water authorities in meeting the aspirations of the Bonn 
Charter and becoming “high reliability” services while still out-performing their financial and 
service level targets. 
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Table 1. Selection of studies that report aspects of water utility ownership, regulation and business performance 
Authors Study focus Principal findings 
Bhattacharyya et al. (1995) Specification and effect of ownership on the econometric 
efficiency of water utilities. 
Public ownership is more efficient. Privatization enables 
technological changes but does not appear to change the rate of 
efficiency improvement. 
Saal & Parker (2000) The impact of privatization and regulation on the water and 
sewerage industry in England and Wales: a translog cost 
function model. 
Changes to price cap regulations had a greater impact on 
efficiency than privatization. 
Saal & Parker (2001) Productivity and price performance in the privatized water 
and sewerage companies of England and Wales. 
Profitability improvements were realised within the UK Water 
industry but there is little evidence to suggest expected 
productivity gains were achieved. 
Renzetti & Dupont (2003) Ownership and performance of water utilities. There is little empirical evidence that supports the view that 
privatization is more efficient that public ownership models. 
Renzetti & Dupont (2004) The performance of municipal water utilities: evidence for 
the role of ownership. 
There is a lack of evidence that private ownership is more 
efficient than public ownership. Changes in ownership need to 
be accompanied by the introduction of competition and output 
markets. 
Dore et al. (2004) Privatization of water in the UK and France: what can we 
learn? 
The evidence presented from the UK and France does not 
support the case that the private sector is more efficient in 
delivery of water services. 
García-Sánchez (2006) Efficiency measurement in Spanish local government: the 
case of municipal water services. 
There is no evidence to suggest that ownership models affect the 
efficiency of  water utilities. 
Saal et al. (2007) Determining the contribution of technical change, 
efficiency change and scale change to productivity growth 
in the privatized English and Welsh water and sewerage 
industry: 1985–2000. 
Public ownership is more efficient. Privatization enables 
technological changes but does not appear to change the rate of 
efficiency improvement. 
Ruester & Zschille (2010) The impact of governance structure on firm performance: 
an application to the German water distribution sector. 
Public ownership appears more efficient than private models. 
This appears to be influenced by public institutions bringing 
private organizations to operate more technically challenging 
treatment processes. 
 
Table 2. Database resources used in the literature review 
Database Description Subject of interest Keywords used* Authors searched* No. 
papers 
returned 
No. 
papers 
read 
Scopus A huge database covering all areas of 
science, technology and medicine. It 
has several functions that allow 
searchers to personalize it to their 
own interests. 
Risk, risk 
management, water 
utility management, 
public health, water 
management, 
sustainability. 
Risk, management, 
water, utilities, 
epistemic uncertainty, 
stochastic uncertainty 
Hamilton, Hrudey, 
MacGillivrayPaté-Cornell, 
Pollard, Strutt. 
1567 38 
Environment 
Complete 
(EBSCO) 
Subject coverage includes 
agriculture, ecosystem ecology, 
energy, environmental law, 
geography, marine and freshwater 
science, natural resources, pollution 
and waste management, renewable 
energy, urban planning. 
Water management, 
water, sustainability, 
health and the 
environment. 
Risk, management, 
water, utilities, 
epistemic uncertainty, 
stochastic uncertainty 
Hamilton, Hrudey, 
MacGillivrayPaté-Cornell, 
Pollard, Strutt. 
429 12 
Science Direct 
(Elsevier 
Science 
Journals) 
Full text journal articles in the field 
of science and technology. Also 
provides a current awareness service 
and a powerful scientific internet 
search engine called Scirus. 
Water management, 
water general. 
Risk, reliability, water 
management, utilities, 
ownership 
Hamilton, Hrudey, 
MacGillivrayPaté-Cornell, 
Pollard, Strutt. 
1387 24 
Web of 
Knowledge 
Consisting of Web of Science 
(WoS), with conference proceedings, 
and Medline, it covers a very broad 
range of subjects relating to science, 
technology, social sciences and 
medicine. It also contains Journal 
Citation Reports (JCR). The ability 
to carry out citation searching is a 
key feature. 
Risk, reliability, 
water management, 
sustainability, water, 
human factors and 
psychology. 
Governance, 
leadership, heuristics, 
risk, ownership, 
privatization, 
regulation, water, 
stochastic frontier 
models. 
Bakker, Hamilton, , 
Hrudey, MacGillivray, 
Parker , Paté-Cornell, 
Pollard, , Saal, Sawkins,  
Stern, Strutt,  Reuster, 
Zschille. 
1886 32 
ABI Inform 
Complete 
(ProQuest) 
Full-text access to approximately 
2,500 international business 
periodicals contained within the ABI 
Economics, business 
models, financial 
management, 
Governance, 
leadership, heuristics, 
risk, ownership, 
Bakker, Cubbin, 
Gigernzer, Johnston, 
Ostrom, Parker, Reuster, 
532 15 
Inform Global, Trade and Industry, 
and Dateline databases. Coverage: 
1971 – current. 
governance. privatization, 
regulation, water, 
stochastic frontier 
models. 
Saal, Stern, Zschille. 
Business 
Source 
Complete 
(EBSCO) 
Full-text access to more than 2,800 
scholarly business publications 
including over 900 peer-reviewed 
journals. Also includes book content, 
conference proceedings, country, 
industry and market reports. 
Coverage: variable (1922 – current). 
Economics, business 
models, financial 
management, 
governance, human 
factors, psychology. 
Governance, 
leadership, heuristics, 
risk, ownership, 
privatization, 
regulation, water, 
stochastic frontier 
models, culture, 
culture web. 
Bakker, Cubbin, 
Gigernzer, Johnston, 
Ostrom, Parker, Saal, 
Stern, Reuster, Zschille. 
442 53 
Factiva Dow Jones service covering over 
10,000 global press sources including 
over 2,000 newspapers and 4,000 
trade publications. Also an excellent 
source of company information and 
financials. Coverage: variable (up to 
30 years – current). 
Economics, business 
models, financial 
management, 
governance, human 
factors, psychology. 
Governance, 
leadership, Heuristics, 
risk, ownership, 
privatization, 
regulation, water, 
stochastic frontier 
models, culture, 
culture web. 
Bakker, Cubbin, 
Gigernzer, Johnston, 
Ostrom, Parker, Saal, 
Stern, Reuster, Zschille. 
1005 17 
 
* The authors listed were used as a starting point for further investigation and study, which led to work produced by others that has been used to 
inform the study. The keywords and authors were aligned to the core disciplines covered in each search engine.  
Table 3. Utility ownership models in the water sector (adapted from Ruester & Zschille, 2010) 
 
Ownership model description Advantages Limitations Example countries 
Public ownership and operation Full State control All financial and operational 
risk sits with the governing 
institution 
America, Germany, The 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Scotland, Singapore, Uganda 
Leased assets operated by contractors Assets remain State owned Operational and some financial 
risk sit with the contractors 
America, Australia, France, 
Germany, Panama, 
Philippines 
Cooperation (partnering) model with 
public institution the majority shareholder 
Financial and operational risks are jointly 
owned 
Operational and some financial 
risk sit with the contractors 
America, Argentina, 
Australia, France, Germany, 
Panama, Philippines 
Contracting out of management activity 
that includes planning, financing, 
construction and operation 
Financial and operational risks are spread 
across a range of business 
Difficult to co-ordinate and get 
best value. Some businesses 
may bid low to win the contract 
which will lead to budget over 
spend 
America, Argentina, 
Australia, France, Germany, 
Panama, Philippines  
Concession model that stops short of full 
privatization 
Most of the risk sits with the contractors. 
There may be sufficient incentive to drive 
out-performance of the contract. The 
contract will be better defined and run for 
longer period, providing stability 
The public institutions will still 
be fully accountable for service 
failures 
America, Australia, France, 
Germany 
Privatization Service provision, financial and operational 
risk are the responsibility of the private 
organization. Efficiency improvements 
should be achieved 
Little state intervention. Private 
institution must meet service 
standards and shareholder 
demands 
Chile, England 
 
  
Figure 1. The influence of regulation on risk and risk management. 
Figure 2. The influence of ownership on risk and risk management. 
Figure 3. The influence of culture on risk and risk management. 
Figure 4. Conceptual framework of interdependencies that inform risk management strategy choice.  
 
